Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching by Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Marriage and Divorce in a Model of
Matching
Ayse Mumcu and Ismail Saglam
Bogazici University
September 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/
MPRA Paper No. 1907, posted 25. February 2007
Marriage and Divorce in a Model
of Matching1
AyS¸e Mumcu
Department of Economics, Bogazici University and
University of Pennsylvania
and
Ismail Saglam2
Department of Economics, Bogazici University and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distri-
bution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching
with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run
simulations to find the eﬀects of alimony rate, legal cost of divorce,
initial endowments, couple and single productivity parameters on the
payoﬀs and marital status in the society.
Keywords: Matching, bargaining, marriage, divorce.
JEL Codes: C78, J12.
1 Introduction
Being unmarried, married or divorced are decisions faced by every human
being during his/her lifetime with far-reaching economic implications both
for individuals and the society as a whole. While in most societies, these de-
cisions are taken by individuals, hence determined by individual preferences,
1The authors thank Gokhan Ozertan for helpful comments. The second author ac-
knowledges the support of Turkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of ‘Distinguished
Young Scientist Award Program’ (TUBA-GEBIP). The usual disclaimer applies.
2Corresponding Author. Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, 50 Memorial Drive E52-391, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. e-mail: saglam@mit.edu
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they are also significantly shaped by social norms that draw the boundaries
of the pool of eligible mates, civil laws that govern marital dissolution, and
economic environments that frame marriage and divorce possibilities.
‘Marriage’ that has always lied at the centre of sociology, has also drawn
the constant attention of economists in the last fifty years as it involves a
choice problem of selecting a mate as well as a wealth allocation problem both
within the marriage and at marital dissolution. In fact, these two problems
are intertwined and therefore any of them cannot be tackled in isolation.
An early strand of literature that followed the pioneering work of Samuel-
son (1956) and Becker (1974, 1981) on common preference models of family,
omitted the problem of formation of marriages and only studied strategic
considerations within the family. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
and Horney (1981) modelled family demands as an outcome of a bargaining
solution where threat points of agents were taken to be exogenously deter-
mined payoﬀs from divorce. Although these models on marriage commonly
missed one important element, namely, the matching market, the implica-
tions of its absence was neither long unnoticed nor underestimated. Indeed,
Becker (1991) himself emphasized the importance of matching market as a
determinant of wealth distribution between men and women. As he pointed
out, wealth distribution within marriage not only depends on partners’ re-
spective contributions to marriage but also on alternative matches available
to each partner in marriage market. The other direction of the interaction
between the formation of marriages and marital distribution was later no-
ticed by Lundberg and Pollak (1993), who argued that policies that transfer
income from husbands or wives aﬀect not only the marital distribution of sur-
plus within existing marriages but also the number of equilibrium matchings
in subsequent marriage markets.
Recently, there have been studies that model the relationship between
marital distribution and marital choice in a search-theoretic framework. Ag-
ents in this framework draw from a distribution of mates in the marriage
market, and thus make their marital decisions. Bougheas and Georgellis
(1999) examined the eﬀect of divorce costs on both marriage formation and
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dissolution. Aiyagari et. al. (2000) constructed an overlapping generations
search model of marriage and divorce, and examined the eﬀects of antipoverty
policies (child support and welfare) on decision to marry, divorce and invest
on children. Greenwood et. al. (2003) extended the Aiyagari et. al. (2000)
by endogenizing the family size. Chiappori and Weiss (2003) studied, in a
search theoretic general equilibrium model of marriage, the determination of
divorce transfers.
In this paper, we deal with the said problem of marriage formation and
marital distribution in a model of ‘matching’, diﬀering from the existing
literature. Individuals’ decisions to be unmarried, married, divorced and
remarried along with wealth distribution within the marriage are determined
and analyzed in a two-period matching model through a recursive bargaining
process, which is borrowed from Crawford and Rochford (1986) (hereafter
CR).
Given that most individuals consider their immediate network of friends,
colleagues and acquaintances as an eligible mate, we consider a prototype of
an economy inhabited by two men and two women living for two periods.
Each individual is born with an endowment (not necessarily identical) and
they have mate-specific emotional utilities reflecting their aﬀection to each
possible match. A match between a man and a woman produces a surplus
that is assumed to be linear in the total endowments of the couple. If an
individual chooses to stay single then he/she produces a surplus combining
his/her endowment with a single productivity parameter. Marital distribu-
tion is determined via Nash bargaining with the threat point of an individual
being given by his/her bargaining payoﬀ from an alternative mate.
Initially no agent is married. At the beginning of each period marriage
market opens, allowing agents to change their marital status. In each pe-
riod, agents reach to men-optimal stable matching and obtain the implied
bargaining payoﬀs using the ‘matching with bargaining equilibrium’ of CR.
The recursive procedure proposed by CR calculates the disagreement points
for a given pair of agents as the bargaining equilibrium payoﬀs that they
would receive in a reduced market obtained by setting the match between
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the pair in consideration unproductive and letting the match opportunities
of all other agents unchanged.3
We assume that agents can divorce at the end of period one unilaterally,
and in such an event separating partners incur a legal divorce cost and person-
specific emotional distress. Moreover, man is obliged to pay to woman a
fraction of his period-one marriage surplus as an alimony.4 Beginning-of-
period 2 endowment of each individual is then determined by his/her period-
one bargaining payoﬀ net of all types of divorce costs (if any).
Due to the complex nature of the model, the closed-form solution of the
problem cannot be obtained. Thus to make comparative statics, we simu-
late the model for an artificial economy. For each of the model parameters,
namely, alimony rate, legal cost of divorce, initial endowments, couple and
single productivity parameters, we examine the changes in the payoﬀs of men,
women, and the whole society as well as changes in the frequencies of being
i) single in both periods, ii) married only in the first period, iii) married only
in the second period, iv) married with distinct mates in the two periods, v)
married with the same mate in both periods.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 presents our simulation results and relates them to the
3Bargaining equilibrium of CR is criticized for having a drawback that an agent’s utility
obtained from his or her original marriage cannot aﬀect his or her utility in an alternative
marriage. As a remedy, Bennett (1988) proposes a new bargaining equilibrium, which
always yields a core matching that is Pareto optimal and maximizes aggregate utility.
However, this alternative solution rests upon much stronger behavioral assumptions about
players, who must always be consistent in their conjectures and able to solve fixed point
problems. While Bennett’s bargaining equilibrium is uniquely appealing in the design
and implementation of matching algorithms for a market designer who can rationally act
on behalf of agents of any degree of rationality, the appropriate choice between the two
equilibrium definitions by CR and Bennett in modelling the observed marital behavior in
a particular society cannot be determined independently from the investigated rationality
of the involved agents. In this paper, we prefer to use computationally more tractable
equilibrium of CR for our simulations, consciously assuming away the full consistency of
agents in the marriage market.
4According to McManus and DiPrete (2001), noncustodial parents are ovewhelmingly
male and alimony payments almost exclusively flow from men to women.
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existing theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a society with two men m1,m2 and two women w1, w2 living for
two periods indexed by t = 1, 2. The set of men and women are denoted
by M and W , respectively. The set of all possible feasible assignments of
women to men are denoted byM ≡ {μ :W →M |μ is one-to-one}.
The endowment of agent i in M ∪ W at the beginning of period t is
ei(t) ∈ <+. Agent i is born with ei(1); however ei(2) which we call an
interim endowment is acquired from the share of the total marriage surplus
at the end of the first period. The emotional utility of agent i derived from a
match with agent j in period t is ui(j, t) ∈ <. The emotional utility of agent
i from being single is normalized to zero, i.e. ui(i, t) = 0.
The marriage market in period t is defined as the complete list of endow-
ments and all utility possibilities, and denoted by Ω(t).
We assume that the match between man i and woman j converts total
endowments into total utility Eij(t) to be shared (bargained over) through a
linear production technology, i.e.
(1) Eij(t) = fij[ei(t) + ej(t)]
where the linear productivity parameters satisfy fij = fji ∈ <+.
The disagreement point from a match between man i and woman j is
hdi(j,Ωt), dj(i,Ωt)i. In our one-to-one matching market with transferrable
utility, bargaining problems are solved by applying Nash (1950) solution,
which yields to agents equal shares of gains from cooperation. Thus, the
payoﬀ to agent i when matched with j is
πi(j;Ωt) = max{biei(t), ui(j, t) + min{Eij(t), (1/2)[Eij(t) + di(j,Ωt)(2)
−dj(i,Ωt)]}}
where bi ∈ <+ is the productivity parameter of the linear technology that
converts agent i’s endowment into end-of-period utility when he/she is single.
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Equation (2) ensures that all the surplus from a marriage is distributed and
each agent gets at least as great as when he/she remains single.
Agent i who is matched in period 1 incurs legal divorce cost c, and an
emotional distress cui at the end of the period if he/she divorces from his/her
mate. In addition, in the event of divorce, man is obliged to pay to woman
a fraction, a, of his end-of-period 1 marriage surplus (in endowment terms)
as an alimony.
Thus, the period 2 endowment of man i who divorces from woman j at
the end of period 1 is
(3) ei(2) = (1− a)[πi(j;Ω1)− ui(j, 1)]− c
and the period 2 endowment of woman j who divorces from man i at period
1 is
(4) ej(2) = πj(i;Ω1)− uj(i, 1) + a[πi(j;Ω1)− ui(j, 1)]− c.
The period 2 emotional utility of agent i who divorces from agent j at
the end of period 1 and considers to be matched with agent k is
(5) ui(k, 2) = ui(k, 1)− cui .
Agent i feels no emotional distress if he/she does not divorce from his/her
mate.
An allocation in the marriage market Ω(t) consists of an assignment of
agents μ(., t), and a payoﬀ vector x(., t). Borrowing from CR, we define a
bargaining equilibrium for Ω(t) as an assignment/payoﬀ pair (μ(., t), x(., t))
such that5
(6) x(m, t) = πm(μ−1(m, t);Ωt) for all m ∈M, and
5In fact, our two-period model also allows one to define and use a ‘dynamic’ equilibrium
considering the life-time payoﬀs in individuals’ decision problems. In such an equilibrium,
a pair of poor agents that have extremely strong aﬀections to each other may rather marry
with rich and otherwise ‘unattractive’ individuals in the first period for the sole purpose of
fortune-hunting (wealth-accumulating), and then they may divorce and marry with their
‘genuine lovers’ in the second period. As we do not believe that the majority of marriages
in the modern societies are driven by such far-sighted opportunistic motives, we prefer to
use the single-shot equilibrium notion of CR in every period of our model.
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x(w, t) = πw(μ(w, t);Ωt) for all w ∈W,
(7) there do not exist agents m ∈M and w ∈W such that
πm(w;Ωt) > x(m, t) and πw(m;Ωt) > x(w, t).
Condition (6) requires that agents matched under μ(, .t) obtain payoﬀs de-
termined by the bargaining solution in (2). Condition (7) simply requires
that no pair of agents have strict incentives to block the matching μ(., t).
Together with the bargaining solution in (2), which checks the incentive of
each agent to individually block a given matching, condition (7) defines the
stability notion in the usual way.
To determine the disagreement (threat) points, we slightly modify recur-
sive procedure by CR to allow for situations in which agents have emotional
utilities. For a given pairm ∈M and w ∈W , we construct the reduced mar-
ket Ω0(t) from Ω(t) by setting the match between m and w as unproductive,
i.e.
(8) πm(w;Ω0t) = bmem(t) and πw(m;Ω
0
t) = bwew(t),
and letting Ω0t = Ωt for all agents in M ∪ W except for m and w. Let
hμ0(., t), x0(., t)i be a bargaining equilibrium in Ω0t. Then
(9) dm(w;Ωt) = x0(m, t)− um(w, t) and dw(m;Ωt) = x0(w, t)− uw(m, t).
By conditions (8) and (9), the threat points of the pair (m,w) in the market
Ωt are taken as their equilibrium payoﬀs in the reduced market Ω0t (net of
the emotional utilities from their current mates), where they are forced to
remain single while all other agents can still exploit all of their opportunities.
Once agents’ preferences over matches are fixed at any stage of the recur-
sive procedure by the borrowed wisdom of CR in determining threat points,
one can apply Gale and Shapley’s (1962) ‘Deferred Acceptance Algorithm’
(DAA) to find a stable matching that is always known to exist (under some
mild assumptions on preferences, such as completeness and transitivity, which
are trivially satisfied in our model). Of the two versions of the DAA, we
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employ the DAA with men proposing and obtain the men-optimal stable
matching in each step of the recursive procedure.6
The procedure of finding the bargaining equilibrium in a given period is
explicitly described in the Appendix.
3 Simulation Results
Using the GAUSS (version 6.0) we simulated the model for an artificial econ-
omy. (The program codes and the simulated data are available from the au-
thors upon request.) We generated 2401 observation values for the model, by
drawing each model parameter independently (using uniform random number
generators) from a set of seven distinct values.
The parameter values are listed in Table 1. The numbers in curly brackets
are the common set of values that the parameters just above them take. Since
the primary interest here is to get qualitative eﬀects of model parameters on
marital decision and wealth distribution, parameters are picked to yield a rich
set of equilibria involving diverse marital decisions. The single and couple
productivity parameters take values which are above, below, and equal to,
‘one’ to allow for all distinct cases of constant returns to scale. The set of
couple productivity parameters is a superset of the set of single productivity
parameters, which is in line with the recent empirical finding of Zagorsky
(2005).7
Alimony rate, a, takes values in the unit interval. Legal divorce cost, emo-
6By interchanging the names of men and women, the DAA with men proposing simply
changes to the DAA with women proposing. In the DAA with men proposing, initially
nobody is engaged (assigned) or rejected. In each iteration, an unassigned man proposes
to the first acceptable woman on his list that he has not proposed to yet. A woman who
receives a proposal that she prefers to her current assignment accepts it and rejects her
current assignment. The algorithm stops after any step in which every man has either been
rejected by every acceptable women on his list or is engaged to an acceptable woman.
7Using US data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), Zagorsky
(2005) finds that for respondents who married and stay married, per person net worth was
93 per cent higher than for single respondents.
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tional distress parameters, initial endowments of four agents in the marriage
market, and emotional utility parameters assume artificial values.
TABLE 1
Parameter Values
Tastes um1(w1, 1), um1(w2, 1), um2(w1, 1), um2(w2, 1)
{0.28, 0.59, 0.94, 1.31, 1.72, 2.15, 2.62}
uw1(m1, 1), uw1(m2, 1), uw2(m1, 1), uw2(m2, 1)
{0.24, 0.50, 0.77, 1.09, 1.44, 1.86, 2.35}
cum1 , c
u
m2 , c
u
w1 , c
u
w2
{0.39, 0.49, 0.60, 0.70, 0.81, 0.9, 1.02}
Endowments em1(1), em2(1), ew1(1), ew2(1)
{1.04, 2.64, 4.80, 7.51, 10.78, 14.60, 18.98}
Productivity parameters fm1w1 , fm1w2 , fm2w1 , fm2w2
{0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00}
bm1 , bm2 , bw1 , bw2
{0.44, 0.66, 0.87, 1.09, 1.30, 1.52, 1.73}
Policy variables a, c
{0.13, 0.25, 0.38, 0.50, 0.63, 0.75, 0.88}
For the model parameters a, c, em1(1), ew1(1), bm1, bw1, fm1w1 we shall be-
low analyze the variation in the average values (using 343 observations for
each value of the input variables) of the output variables in the list hx(M, 2),
x(W, 2), x(MW, 2), M(ss), M(sm), M(ms), M(mm-c), M(mm-n), W (ss),
W (sm), W (ms), W (mm-c), W (mm-n), MW (ss), MW (sm), MW (ms),
MW (mm-c),MW (mm-n) i. Here, x(M, 2), x(W, 2), x(MW, 2) are respec-
tively the total payoﬀs of men, women, and the whole society, in the second
period, while for any group Z in {M,W,MW} (men, women, society) the
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output variables Z(ss), Z(sm), Z(ms), Z(mm-c), Z(mm-n) respectively de-
note the frequencies of “being single in both periods, married only in the
second period, married only in the first period, married with distinct mates
in the two periods, married with the same mate in both periods". We should
note that M(mm-n) and W (mm-n), and hence MW (mm-n), always take
the same values.
The marital status of the population for the simulated sample is exhibited
in Table 2. The percentage of divorced couples, MW (ms) +MW (mm-c),
is 23.28%, while 27% of these couples remarry after divorce. Calculating
MW (mm-n)/ [MW (mm-n) + MW (mm-c)] shows that 89% of the mar-
riages are stable. Moreover, as should be evident fromMW (sm)/[MW (ss)+
MW (sm)], approximately 10% out of the first-period singles get married in
period two. Strikingly, the characteristics of our sample in terms of marital
distribution fit quite well with the latest U.S. demographic data.8
TABLE 2
Marital Status
(Percentage Distribution)
Male M(ss) M(sm) M(ms) M(mm-c) M(mm-n)
23.41 3.00 17.45 5.83 50.31
Female W (ss) W (sm) W (ms) W (mm-c) W (mm-n)
24.32 2.08 16.53 6.75 50.31
Society MW (ss) MW (sm) MW (ms) MW (mm-c) MW (mm-n)
23.87 2.54 16.99 6.29 50.31
Figure 1 through Figure 6 exhibit comparative static results with respect
8According to U.S. Census Bureau, the marital status of people 15 years or over for
all races as of March 2005 is reported as follows: 17.7% of the population is separated,
divorced or widowed; 29% is never married, while 53.2% is married.
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to alimony rate. The women’s payoﬀ is increasing and men’s payoﬀ is de-
creasing, while the overall payoﬀ is slightly decreasing. The frequency of
being single in both periods declines across both genders except for a pike
around 0.35. In contrast, the frequency of being married only in the second
period is rising except for a slight dip around 0.4. The frequency of being
married only in the first period is escalating up to 0.75. However, the fre-
quency of being married to diﬀerent partners in the two periods is fluctuating
with a steep upward trend. The sum of the two, which is the frequency of
divorce, is also increasing. Finally, the frequency of being married to the
same partner in both periods falls.
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One can also interpret the parameter a as the child support benefit paid
to the custodian partner, which happens to be women in our model. Then,
our model predicts that child support has positive eﬀects both on the rate
of marriage and on the rate of divorce. While the former is in line with, the
11
latter contrasts with, Aiyagari et. al. (2000). However, in the same context,
Greenwood et. al. (2003) finds small eﬀects of child support on the equilibrium
number of marriages.
The eﬀects of legal cost of divorce on the model outcomes are presented
in Figures 7-12. Since c takes values relatively low with respect to the mag-
nitudes of endowments, its direct eﬀect on the payoﬀs of separating couples
is already expected to be small. The almost horizontal behavior of payoﬀs in
Figure 7 reveals that the indirect eﬀects of c, due to changed marriage oppor-
tunities by the changed endowment structure, must also have been negligibly
small. The divorce frequency fluctuates on a narrower band with respect to
the changes in the legal cost of divorce and reaches a maximum around 0.5,
while at this very level, the frequency of continuing marriages attains its
minimum.
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On the eﬀect of divorce cost on the marital decisions, Becker (1976) ar-
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gued that when divorce becomes easier, the number of people who are legally
married may actually increase, which is partially supported by our find-
ings (Figures 9 and 11). However, empirical studies examining the impact
of changing divorce legislation on marital status are somewhat conflicting.9
While Peters (1986, 1992) find no significant impact of changing divorce laws
on divorce rates, Allen (1992) and Friedberg (1998) refute her finding. Re-
cently, Wolfers (2006) reports that the divorce rate rose sharply following the
adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but this rise was reversed within about
a decade hence the long-run eﬀects are ambigious. Brien et. al. (2006) finds
that decrease in divorce cost leads to a slight increase in the rate of marriage.
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Figure 13 through Figure 18 contain comparative static results with re-
spect to first man’s initial endowment (relabeled as e(m1, 1) in the graphs).
9The relaxation of divorce laws across many U.S. states during 1970s and 1980s reduced
the legal cost of divorce substantially (see Brien et. al., 2006).
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All payoﬀs are increasing; however, men’s aggregate payoﬀ is increasing sig-
nificantly more. While the frequency of divorcing and becoming single steps
up, the frequency of being married to diﬀerent partners in the two periods
fluctuates. Nevertheless, the divorce rate can be shown to be increasing. The
frequency of staying single in both periods is on the average is decreasing for
men while increasing for women.
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Figures 19-24 exhibit the eﬀects of change in w1’s initial endowment (re-
labeled as e(w1, 1) in the graphs). Women’s aggregate payoﬀ is significantly
rising. By the vertical sum of graphs in Figures 22 and 23, the divorce rate is
first increasing and then decreasing in own endowment with a peak around
the average wealth level over the simulation grid. The frequency of being
single in both periods fluctuates. The frequency of being married only in the
second period is decreasing for both genders. The frequency of continuing
marriages has a U-shaped graph.
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The endowment eﬀects of the two genders on divorce rate are not sym-
metric since the matching procedure (DAA with men proposing) that we em-
ployed to characterize the bargaining equilibrium is not gender-symmetric,
either. In a related empirical study, Weiss and Willis (1997) investigated the
role of unexpected changes in earning capacity of either spouses in marital
dissolution. Unlike our finding, they reported that an unexpected increase in
the husband’s earning capacity reduces the divorce hazard. However, their
finding as to the negative eﬀect of the wife’s earning capacity on the divorce
hazard is partially replicated by our simulations.
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Figures 25-36 show comparative static results with respect to single pro-
ductivity parameters bm1 and bw1 (relabeled as b(m1) and b(w1) in the graphs).
Each gender’s payoﬀ is increasing in its own productivity parameter, while
decreasing in the opposite gender’s productivity parameter. The frequency
of being single in both periods is almost always increasing for both genders
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with respect to both bm1 and bw1 . The frequency of continuing marriage is
declining in both gender’s single productivity parameter. By the vertical
addition of graphs in Figures 28-29, the divorce rate is increasing in man’s
single productivity parameter. On the other hand, a similar inspection in
Figures 34-35 reveals that with respect to woman’s single productivity para-
meter, the divorce rate is falling over the intervals [0.4, 0.65] and [1.05,1.30]
and rising elsewhere.
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The single productivity parameter bw1 may admit the interpretation of
welfare payment collected by an unemployed divorced woman.10 Then, our
restated result that an increase in welfare payment (at high levels of bw1), as
an antipoverty policy tool, to women leads to fewer marriages, is in accor-
dance with Aiyagari et. al. (2000). A similar parallel can be drawn for the
10According to Sandefur (1996), 52 per cent of female-headed households were partici-
pating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program in 1992.
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positive eﬀect of welfare policies on the divorce rate, which we observe at
medium and high levels of welfare, i.e. when bw1 lies in either of the intervals
[0.4, 0.65] and [1.05,1.30].
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Figure 37 through Figure 42 exhibit the eﬀects of marriage productivity
fm1,w1 (relabeled as f(m1, w1) in the graphs). As expected, both genders’
payoﬀs are increasing. The relative benefit from being single decreases, lead-
ing to the observed fall in the frequency of remaining single in both periods.
The frequency of marrying only in the second period wildly fluctuates over
a very narrow band. The frequency of being married only in the first period
is slowly rising at low productivity levels and then drops oﬀ rapidly, whereas
the frequency of changing mates is increasing almost everywhere. Hence,
the overall divorce rate can be shown to have an inverted U-shape with a
peak around 1.5. The frequency of continuing marriages is increasing for
productivity values exceeding one.
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Considering the child as the outcome of a ‘productive marriage’ (associ-
ated with a productivity parameter greater than one), we observe that the
stability of marriage is increasing with the value (or the number) of children.
In fact, this finding of ours is supported by an experiment of Brien et. al.
(2006), which showed that the rate of marriage is increasing in the value of
child. A similar result on the stabilizing eﬀect of children on marriage is
reported by Weiss and Willis (1997).
4 Conclusion
In the last hundred years, the divorce rates experienced a sharp increase.11
The positive welfare eﬀects of divorce through facilitating the termination
of malfunctioning marriages (e.g. marriages involving domestic violence and
child abuse) are on average outweighed by post-separation costs especially
borne by women and children.12 The rise in the divorce rates has conse-
quently attracted the attention of researchers in understanding and modelling
marital dissolution, and increased the awareness of policy makers towards
taking measures to enhance the stability of marriages as well as to alleviate
the post-separation costs. In this respect, our study has analyzed the eﬀects
of alimony, child support benefit, welfare programs and divorce laws among
such policy measures on the divorce rate and the marriage rate.
The novelty in our paper is to study marital choice and marital distrib-
ution in a matching market. The existing literature that handles the same
11Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) reports that in the United States over the last 150 years
divorce rates have risen with a rate of 3.6 divorces per thousand people and 16.7 per
thousand married couples by 2005.
12McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) reports that, in 1995, the median income for female
headed families with children was about one-third of the median income for married couple
with children. Moreover, the rates to drop out of high school, to be idle, to experience
teen births and not to take college education are higher for children living in single-parent
households than for children from two-parent families. Page and Stevens (2002) finds that
in the long-run (six or more years after the most recent divorce) family income falls by 40
to 45% after divorce, and food consumption is reduced by 17%.
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problem in a search-theoretic framework emphasizes the random nature of
meeting a potential mate. In each period, an agent randomly draws only
one from the pool of mates and decides whether to marry or not. In our
framework, agents in every period consider the whole set of mates as feasible
and decide to whom to propose for marriage.
In reality, the pool of feasible mates for each individual expands over time
by controlled as well as uncontrolled entrances of new candidates, i.e. the
formation of mate pools is to some extent random in nature. However, given a
pool of feasible mates individuals do not determine their prospective partners
by random draws. Instead, individuals make pairwise comparisons and form
(usually short) preference lists over the pool, according to which they make
sequential proposals for marriage. The interaction of the separate decisions
of individuals on the opposite sides of the marriage market then determines
the equilibrium assignment. In this respect, while both search and matching
models have their own uses and strengths, a more complete framework of
a marriage market should integrate the two, taking also into consideration
the potential benefits of non-cooperative versus cooperative bargaining in
simultaneously resolving the marital distribution and determining the marital
choice.13
Appendix
This Appendix contains the procedure of finding the bargaining equilib-
rium in a given period.
Marriage Rule: For the agents forming a given pair, calculate the bargaining
payoﬀs using equation (2). Divorce the agents if and only if at least one of
the agents is not worse oﬀ by remaining single. In that case, assign to both
agents in the pair the payoﬀs from being single.
Step 1: Pick a permutation {pi, pj, pk, pl} of the pairs p1 = (m1, w1), p2 =
(m1, w2), p3 = (m2, w1), p4 = (m2, w2).
13For a non-cooperative model of marriage, see Lundberg and Pollak (1994, 1996).
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Step 2: For the agents forming the pair pl, set the disagreement points equal
to the payoﬀs from being single and calculate the bargaining payoﬀs using
the Marriage Rule. Next, for the agents entering both pk and pl set the
disagreement points to their calculated bargaining payoﬀs in the pair pl, and
for the remaining agents in pk set the disagreement points to the payoﬀs from
being single. Then, as the outcome of this step, determine the marital status
and bargaining payoﬀs of the pair pk using the Marriage Rule.
Step 3: Repeat step 2 by interchanging the roles of pl and pk, and obtain the
marital status and bargaining payoﬀs of the pair pl.
Step 4: Using the bargaining allocation obtained for pk and pl in steps 2 and
3, respectively, find the men-optimal stable matching for the agents in pk∪pl.
Step 5: For the agents in pj, set the disagreement points to the bargaining
payoﬀs obtained under the stable matching calculated in step 4 if these agents
are also in pk or pl, and otherwise set them to the payoﬀs from being single.
Then, find the marital status and payoﬀs for the pair pj using the Marriage
Rule.
Step 6: Repeat steps 2-5 consecutively for the permutations (pi, pk, pj, pl)
and (pi, pl, pj, pk), and obtain the marital status and payoﬀs of the pairs pk
and pl, respectively.
Step 7: Let the pair pi be unproductive and the agents in pi have their payoﬀs
from being single.
Step 8: Using the marital status and payoﬀs assumed or calculated for pi, pj,
pk, and pl in steps 2-7, find the men-optimal stable matching and the implied
payoﬀs.
Step 9: For the agents in pi, set the disagreement points to their bargaining
payoﬀs calculated in step 8. Next, find the marital status and bargaining
payoﬀs of the pair pi using the Marriage Rule.
Step 10: Repeat steps 2-9 consecutively for the permutations (pj, pi, pk, pl),
(pk, pi, pj, pl), (pl, pi, pj, pk), and obtain the marital status and bargaining
payoﬀs for the pairs pj, pk, and pl, respectively.
20
Step 11: Using the marital status and bargaining payoﬀs calculated for the
pairs pi, pj, pk, and pl, determine the men-optimal stable matching (hence
the bargaining equilibrium) for the marriage market.
References
Aiyagari, Rao; Greenwood, Jeremy and Guner, Nezihi. “On the State of
Union." Journal of Political Economy, April 2000, 108(2), pp. 213-44.
Allen, Douglas A. “Marriage and Divorce: Coment." American Economic
Review, June 1992, 82(3), pp. 679-85.
Becker, Gary S. “A Theory of Social Interactions." Journal of Political Econ-
omy, December 1974, 82(6), pp. 1063-94.
Becker, Gary S. A treatise on the family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1981, enlarged edition 1991.
Becker, Gary S. The economic approach to human behavior. Chigaco, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Bennett, Elaine. “Consistent Bargaining Conjectures inMarriage andMatch-
ing." Journal of Economic Theory, August 1988, 45(2), pp. 392-407.
Bougheas, Spiros and Georgellis, Yannis. “The Eﬀect of Divorce Costs on
Marriage Formation and Dissolution." Journal of Population Economics,
August 1999, 12(3), pp. 489-98.
Brien, Michael J.; Liliard, Lee A. and Steven, Stern. “Cohabitation, Mar-
riage, and Divorce in a Model of Match Quality." International Economic
Review, May 2006, 47(2), pp. 451-94.
Chiappori, Pierre A. and Weiss, Yoram. “Marriage Contracts and Divorce:
An Equilibrium Analysis." Manuscript, 2003.
Crawford, Vincent P. and Rochford, Sharon C. “Bargaining and Competition
in Matching Markets." International Economic Review, June 1986, 27(2),
pp. 329-48.
Friedberg, Leora. “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence
from Panel Data." American Economic Review, June 1998, 88(3), pp. 608-
27.
21
Gale, David and Shapley, Lloyd S. “College Admissions and the Stability
of Marriage." American Mathematical Monthly, January 1962, 69(1), pp.
9-15.
Gray, Jeﬀrey S. “Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married
Women’s Labor Supply." American Economic Review, June 1998, 88(3),
pp. 628-42.
Greenwood, Jeremy; Guner, Nezihi and Knowles, John. “More on Marriage,
Fertility, and the Distribution of Income." International Economic Review,
August 2003, 44(3), 827-62.
Lundberg, Shelly and Pollak, Robert A. “Separate Spheres Bargaining and
the Marriage Market." Journal of Political Economy, December 1993,
101(6), pp. 988-1010.
Lundberg, Shelly and Pollak, Robert A. “Non-cooperative BargainingModels
of Marriage." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May
1994, 84(2), pp. 132-37.
Lundberg, Shelly and Pollak, Robert A. “Bargaining and Distribution in
Marriage." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Autumn 1996, 10(4), pp.
139-58.
Manser, Marilyn and Brown, Murray. “Marriage and Household Decision
Making: A Bargaining Analysis." International Economic Review, Febru-
ary 1980, 21(1), pp. 31-44.
McElroy, Marjorie B. and Horney, Mary J. “Nash Bargained Household De-
cisions." International Economic Review, June 1981, 22(2), pp. 333-49.
McLanahan, Sara and Sandefur, Gary D. Growing up with a single parent:
what hurts, what helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
McManus, Patricia A. and DiPrete, Thomas A. “Losers and Winners: The
Financial Consequences of Separation and Divorce for Men." American
Sociological Review, April 2001, 66(2), pp. 246-68.
Nash, John F. “The Bargaining Problem." Econometrica, April 1950, 18(2),
pp. 155-62.
Page, Marianne E. and Stevens, Ann H. “Will You Miss Me When I am
Gone? The Economic Consequences of Absent Parents." NBER Working
22
Paper Series, No: 8786, 2002.
Peters, H. Elizabeth. “Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and
Private Contracting." American Economic Review, June 1986, 76(3), pp.
437-54.
Peters, H. Elizabeth. “Marriage and Divorce: Reply." American Economic
Review, June 1992, 82(3), pp. 686-93.
Samuelson, Paul A. “Social Indiﬀerence Curves." Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, February 1956, 70(1), pp. 1-22.
Sandefur, Gary D. “Trends in AFDC Participation Rates: The Implications
of Welfare Reform." Discussion Paper No: 1116-96, Madison: University
of Wisconsin, Institute of Research on Poverty, 1996.
Stevenson, Betsey and Wolfers, Justin. “Marriage and Divorce: Changes
and their Driving Forces." Written for the Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, Symposium Celebrating 25 Years since Becker’s Treatise on the Fam-
ily, Winter 2007.
Weiss, Yoram and Willis, Robert J. “Match Quality, New Information, and
Marital Dissolution." Journal of Labor Economics, January 1997, 15(1),
Part 2: Essays in Honor of Yoram Ben-Porath, pp. S293-S329.
Wolfers, Justin. “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconcili-
ation and New Results." American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Zagorsky, Jay L. “Marriage and Divorce’s Impact on Wealth." Journal of
Sociology, December 2005, 41(4), pp. 406-24.
23
